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I.

INTRODUCTION

Today's antitrust laws suffer from a poor mix of enforcement
2
weapons., The purpose of the antitrust laws is protecting competition
and consumer welfare through compensation and deterrence. 3 Cur-

rently, treble damage suits attempt to compensate and deter by forcing
a guilty defendant to pay a plaintiff three times the plaintiffs actual

*EditrsNote: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Reviw Apprentice Prize for the
best student note submitted in the Fall 1988 semester.
1. Blair, Antitrust Penalties:Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REV.57.
2. Competition is not so easy to define. Clarifying this concept would help the courts
determine just what it is they are trying to protect. In other words, the antitrust laws protect
a thing (competition) indefinite in scope. For a discussion of the "relevant goals" of antitrust
and the meaning of competition, see Johnson & Ferrill, Defining Competition: Economic
Analysis and Antitrust Decision Making, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 583 (1984).
3. See infra notes 22-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the statutes commonly
referred to as the antitrust laws, see infra note 64.
153
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damages. 4 Several factors, however, undermine the effectiveness of
treble damage suits. 5 Improved enforcement would limit recovery to
actual damages and substitute imprisonment as a deterrent. 6 Eliminat-7
ing treble damages would reduce incentives to file frivolous lawsuits,
while greater use of imprisonment" would deter potential violators and
prevent them from shifting the penalty to the corporation, and ultimately, the consumer. 9
Both civil and criminal penalties attach to antitrust violations.10 A

4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
5. See infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive assessment of treble
damages, see HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF THE
ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY

1-49 (Comm. Print 1984) (primarily composed of a

study conducted by George E. Garvey, Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of
America). The study addresses both economic and noneconomic criticisms of treble damages.
The conclusion suggests that major reform should await a more comprehensive empirical study
of the treble damage remedy. Id. at 3; see also Salop & White, Economic Analysis of Private
Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001 (1986) (a statistical synthesis of the data on private
antitrust litigation).
6. See infra notes 123-37 & 145-49 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 123-37 & 151-55 and accompanying text.
9. Blair, A Suggestionfor Improved Antitrust Enforcement, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 433,
440-41 (1985).
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 15 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 2.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
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Sherman Antitrust Act'1 violation is a felony punishable by a threeyear maximum prison sentence and a maximum fine of $1,000,000. 2
In addition, an injured plaintiff may seek treble damages from the
violator.13 These provisions attempt to accomplish the compensation
and deterrence goals of federal antitrust law.14 Dissatisfied with the
deterrent effect of treble damage suits, 15 economists have proposed
models of optimal deterrence, some of which totally eliminate compensation.' 6r These extreme models focus primarily on deterrence. Concededly, if laws could achieve one hundred percent deterrence, compensation would be unnecessary, but one hundred percent deterrence
is infeasible. 1 Therefore, an improved antitrust system should retain
both goals,' 8 but should focus on achieving both more effectively and
efficiently.
Following this introduction, part II of this note addresses the
antitrust goal of protecting competition and preventing economic damage. This damage, known as the deadweight social welfare loss, is
caused by the misallocation of resources that is endemic to monopoly. 19
Part III compares the compensation and deterrence goals of antitrust
to the similar goals of compensation and deterrence in tort. To reach
these goals, antitrust law must do more than simply borrow from
another body of law; it must develop its own cohesive case law both
to notify business people of what constitutes illegal behavior and to
discourage plaintiffs from filing frivolous suits. Part IV discusses the
failure of treble damage suits to provide adequate deterrence and
critiques economists' suggestions for optimal deterrence. This discus-

damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. § 15(a).
Section 4 of the Clayton Act superseded section 7 of the Sherman Act. K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 63 (1976).

11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982); supra note 10 (quoting sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Act).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982); supra note 10 (quoting sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Act).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); supra note 10 (quoting section 4 of Clayton Act).
14. Blair, supra note 1, at 57.
15. See Polinsky, infra note 149; Easterbrook, infranote 149; see, e.g., Cavanagh, Detrebling
Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 820-48 (1987)
(explores alternatives to the status quo including the abolition of treble damages and various
methods of selective de-trebling); Werden & Simon, An Economic Assessment of the Administration's De-trebling Proposal, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 935 (1986) (a favorable review of the
Reagan selective de-trebling plan).
16. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
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sion includes an analysis of alternative deterrents - fines and imprisonment. Finally, part V recommends limiting plaintiffs' recoveries to
actual damages. Currently, treble damages distort rather than promote antitrust goals by giving plaintiffs noncompensatory incentives
to sue. 20 The recommendation suggests that "de-trebling" be contingent
on transferring the deterrence burden from treble damages to imprisonment.

21

II.

THE PURPOSE: PROTECTING COMPETITION

Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in response to public
discontent with monopolistic business. 22 By reducing the incentive of
individual businesses to monopolize in order to protect the overall
competitive process,2 the legislation both tempers and promotes laissez-faire.24
Although the procompetitive principles of antitrust generally are
accepted, 2- its more specific goals are subject to debate. 26 The debate
includes three views,- 7 all of which incorporate economic efficiency to
some degree. The first view considers economic efficiencyr along with
social, moral, and political concerns. These concerns include the protection of small business, the dilution of concentrated economic power,
and the promotion of individual liberty.m However, consensus is lacking on the relative importance of each of these concerns1 °
The second and third views focus on the two economic effects of
monopoly: wealth transfer and the misallocation of resources. Under

20. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 145-49 & 151-55 and accompanying text.
22. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 161-62 (1954) ('ield of public opinion ultimately resulting in the enactment of the Sherman Act are [sic] not very easily summarized").
23. See id. at 1-2 (paradoxically, Sherman Act both accords with and deviates from laissezfaire and social Darwinism).
24. Id.
25. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (1982). Lande's paper is an intensive
look at the legislative histories of the antitrust laws. Ultimately, Lande rejects the view that
economic efficiency was Congress's primary goal for the antitrust laws. Instead, he states that
the antitrust laws were broad mandates to improve consumer welfare. Lande advocates modern
economic theory as the methodology to determine what is more or less likely to harm consumer
welfare. Id. at 150-51.
26. Id. at 67 n.1.
27. Id. at 68-70.
28. Id. at 69.
29. Id.
30.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss1/4

4

Esquibel: Protecting Competition: The Role of Compensation and Deterrence f
ANTITRUST: PROTECTING COMPETITION

the second view, antitrust laws should deter wealth transfers to the
monopolist. In a monopoly, wealth transfers from consumer to
monopolist, and what would otherwise be consumer surplus becomes
the monopolist's excess profits.1 Such excess profits are absent in a
competitive market32 Accordingly, the laws should protect consumer
surplus by preserving competitive prices.3
The third view of antitrust law concentrates on resource misallocation. This view rejects the wealth transfer view because wealth transfers have no effect on economic efficiency.3 Whether a dollar is in a
consumer's pocket as surplus or in a monopolist's pocket as profit has
no effect on efficiency. 5 This view instead concentrates on the inefficient misallocation of resources- that results when monopolists, as
sole producers, ignore competitive consumer demand when choosing
production levelsY In other words, under monopoly, some consumers
who would be willing and able to pay more than the competitive price
will be unable to purchase the good because of the restricted supply.
This misallocation harms consumer welfare. Generally, this third view
prevails; antitrust law seeks to maximize consumer welfare and allocative efficiency.
A.

Deadweight Social Welfare Loss

The industry graph below illustrates allocative inefficiency.3s Price
See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 36 (1985).
32. Economic theory demonstrates that in the long-run competitive industry, each firm will
make only normal, not excess, profits. Normal profits are defined as what the firm requires as
a return to keep its resources employed in the industry. See E. DOLAN, BASIC ECONOMICS
406-07 (2d ed. 1980).
33. Lande, supra note 25.
34. The wealth transfer would result in a misallocation of resources if the monopolist were
to take the rent and invest it in maintaining the monopoly instead of investing it in the production
of some socially desirable good. R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 31, at 40-41.
35. See id.
36. See id., at 36.
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 36; K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supranote 10, at 5. The deadweight social welfare
graph illustrates a well-accepted phenomenon of monopoly. See, e.g., R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN,
supra note 31, at 1-47; R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 106-15 (1978); K. ELZINGA &
W. BREIT, supra note 10, at 5; Page, Antitrust Damagesand Economic Efficiency: An Approach
to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 478 n.53 (1980). The graph depicts an industry under
perfect competition and the same industry under monopoly.
Economists attribute the following four characteristics to a perfectly competitive industry:
1) a homogeneous product, 2) a large number of buyers and sellers, 3) perfect information, and
4) no artificial barriers to entry. D. WALDMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST 4 (1986).
In reality, few industries or markets conform to this definition. Id. Likewise, few industries
represent a true monopoly. Id. at 7. For most products, several sources of supply or substitutes
31.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

and cost are on the vertical axis and quantity is on the horizontal
axis. The demand curve slopes down and out because of its relationship
to price; as price falls, consumers demand more of a good. The marginal
revenue curve for the monopolist also slopes down and out, but is
steeper than the demand curve. As the monopolist sells each additional
unit, a corresponding decrease in price occurs because of the greater
supply of the good. Although the monopolist sells more units, and
therefore increases total revenue, the sale of the last unit generates
less marginal revenue than the sale of the previous unit because the
price has fallen.
An example illustrates marginal revenue. Assume a firm can sell
100 widgets at $10.00 per widget. Total revenue is $1,000.00 (100
widgets x $10 per widget). Because of the negative slope of the demand
curve, the firm can sell 101 widgets only if the price falls to $9.99.
The firm's sale of widget number 101 contributes $9.99 to total revenue. However, to sell 101 widgets, the firm must charge $.01 less per
unit on each of the other 100 widgets. The total cost to the firm in
lost revenue is $1.00 (100 x .01). The difference between the increase
in total revenue and the lost revenue is the marginal revenue. In this
case, the marginal revenue associated with the 101st widget is
$9.99-$1.00, or $8.99. 31
This economic model assumes that the competitive firm and the
monopolist will maximize profits at the point where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. This point is optimal because an increase or
decrease in production reduces total profits. Marginal revenue equals
marginal cost at point C in a competitive industry. The competitive
firn's marginal revenue is always Po because the competitive firm,
unlike the monopolist, cannot influence price, irrespective of the firm's

are readily available. The government may grant monopoly status to a producer of utilities, but
simultaneously will regulate the producer to prevent the producer from exploiting the monopoly
power. See id. at 10 (some governmentally regulated monopolies sustain losses). Hence, society

receives the benefits of economies of scale without paying exorbitant rents or suffering a deadweight welfare loss. See generally, Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 8,3

J. POL. ECON. 807, 807 ("public regulation probably is a larger source of social costs than
private monopoly costs").
For a detailed exploration of microeconomics (the theory of the firm), see the following
textbooks for comprehensive, instructional analysis: R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, MICROECONOMiICS
FOR MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (1982); W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY:
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS (3d ed. 1985). For summary discussions tailored to
antitrust law, see R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 31, at 1-47; D. WALDMAN, Supra,
at 1-22.
39. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 31, at 26.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss1/4

6

Esquibel: Protecting Competition: The Role of Compensation and Deterrence f
ANTITRUST: PROTECTING COMPETITION

PRICE & COST

WEALTH
TRANSFER
DEADWEIGHT SOCIAL
WELFARE LOSS

P
0
CARTEL
COST

I
I
I
I
I

Q

CARTEL
MARGINAL
COST

I ONPL

DEMAND

Q

output ° The marginal revenue associated with the last unit sold equals
the price of the last unit. For example, a firm may sell 100 widgets
at $10.00 per unit or 101 widgets at $10.00. No revenue is lost by
selling the 101st widget, and the last widget contributes $10.00 to

40. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. One of the assumptions of the competitive
model is a large number of buyers and sellers. R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 31, at
4. The implication of this assumption is that no one firm can influence price. See id.
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total revenue. In sum, the marginal revenue associated with the 101st
unit is $10.00 - $.00 or $10.00.41

Competition results in a price of Po and an output of Qo. At point
C, firms maximize consumer welfare and allocative efficiency because
price equals marginal cost. Not only is the consumer paying the exact
cost to society of that additional unit of output, Po,4 but firms also
are producing the exact quantity demanded by consumers who are
willing and able to pay Po. This state of consumer satisfaction is
allocative efficiency. Essentially, producers' marginal revenue from a
unit of output equals society's cost to produce that unit. Moreover,
both producers' marginal revenue and society's cost equal the price
consumers pay for the unit. This example shows how a competitive
43
environment creates allocative efficiency.
A monopolist, on the other hand, inefficiently allocates resources
because the monopolist is not under competitive pressure. As the sole
producer in the industry, the monopolist can choose the point on the
demand curve at which to produce. Consistent with the monopolist's
profit motive, the monopolist restricts output to Qi so that marginal
revenue will equal marginal cost. Marginal revenue equals marginal
cost at point B in the monopolized industry. Corresponding to this
output restriction is an increase in price to Pi.4 Rectangle PiABPo
represents the monopolist's excess profits, known as the wealth
transfer.

45

Triangle area ABC on the graph measures the damage to competition. Economists call this triangle the deadweight social welfare losso
because it results from allocative inefficiency. 47 Recall that in the competitive industry, all consumers willing and able to pay society's cost
of producing a unit of output could do so. The monopolist, however,
creates allocative inefficiency by restricting output. At the monopoly
price of Pi and the output level of Qj, consumers who could buy at
the competitive price now must either pay a higher price or forego
the purchase. The deadweight loss caused by the misallocation of so-

41. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
42. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMIAN, supra note 31, at 36-37. In this context, "society"
refers to the aggregate of all available resources.
43. Id. at 22. "Maximization of consumer welfare . . . [is] the fundamental argument for

competition." Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 35-38.
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ciety's resources is the ultimate harm to competition. 48 Consider, for
example, "competition" as the plaintiff in an imaginary lawsuit against
an industry monopolist. If the plaintiff could establish that the defendant-monopolist's actions created allocative inefficiency, then the plaintiff could recover actual damages equivalent to the deadweight loss. 49
The concept of deadweight loss is critical to the development of a
cohesive body of antitrust case law.0 Courts have difficulty distinguishing between protection of competition and protection of an inefficient
competitor who merely fails to meet the efficiency demands of the
marketplace.5 1 Antitrust law dedicated to the protection of competition
would better equate a defendant's liability to the allocative inefficiency
the defendant creates.5 2

48. Id. at 35-41. This area underestimates the damages because the graph ignores two
other types of welfare losses. The first, x-inefficiency, is resources wasted by a monopolist
because the monopolist is not subject to competitive pressures to keep costs low. Second, the
wealth transfer provides the monopolist with resources to invest in the socially undesirable good
of achieving monopoly status. Id. at 38-41.
49. As a caveat, however conceptually helpful deadweight loss is to developing a rational
rule of law to enhance market efficiency, the welfare triangle is not a panacea for determining
the measure of damages in an antitrust suit. Empirical measures of the welfare triangle are
difficult if not impossible. The imaginary lawsuit depends on an imaginary plaintiff, competition.
Actual enforcement of the antitrust laws depends on proxy plaintiffs. The proxy plaintiffs may
sue for damages for their injury, which represents a portion of the harm to the competitive
process. However, none of them will be able to extract from the defendant the entire amount
of damages to competition. Additionally, damages are awarded mostly on the basis of the wealth
transfer because of the relative ease of measuring overcharge. Also, plaintiffs may be forced
to forego claims because they may not be able to satisfy the legal doctrines of standing, antitrust
injury, and certainty in damage calculations. The amount they stand to recover may not justify
the effort. The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission also serve as proxy
plaintiffs for competition. However, their enforcement efforts are imperfect because of severe
budget limitations and political pressures. See generally R. BLAIR & D. KASERmAN, supra
note 31, at 61-64, 69-87 (discussion of the purpose and methods of public and private enforcement
of antitrust laws).
50. See R. BoRK, supra note 38, at 50-51.
51. See, e.g., id. at 198-216. "[T]he Warren Court ... took the first occasion that presented
itself, [Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)] ... to convert [Section 7 of the
Clayton Act] to a virulently anticompetitive regulation." Id. at 198. Other cases regularly
criticized for their anticompetitive effects are Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968);
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
52. A proliferation of law review articles and other commentary incorporates the deadweight
social welfare loss analysis. See sup-ra note 38 for examples. It has even crept into the case
law. The Supreme Court in recent decisions has referred to Richard Posner and Robert Bork
as authorities on competitive effects. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In addition to references to
Posner and Bork, both of these cases provide good examples of the modem antitrust analysis
and the difficulty in isolating the elements of an antitrust suit and establishing a cogent antitrust
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The Necessity of Government Intervention

Other than checks from other businesspeople, a completely free
market imposes no restrictions on a businessperson's attempt to
monopolize and profit. Antitrust enforcement reduces the businessperson's incentive to monopolize when checks by private individuals fall
short. Normally, the free market relies on private individuals to check
one another's behavior. For example, one might expect an entrepreneur to supply antitrust enforcement and make it available to consumers.0 Unfortunately, because of its peculiar characteristics - indivisibility and nonexcludability - antitrust enforcement is not a
"good" that entrepreneurs supply.-"
Indivisibility means that more than one person may consume a
good simultaneously; nonexcludability means that once a firm provides
a good, those who refuse to pay for it cannot efficiently be excluded
from consuming it.5 These characteristics create a free-rider problem.6
Most individuals will avoid the cost of antitrust enforcement, hoping
someone else will pay for it. 57 Such avoidance is possible because the
good is available to all simultaneously. For these reasons, government
is the best provider of antitrust enforcement. 8
Conceivably, government and the private sector could achieve one
hundred percent enforcement, but this is undesirable. 59 One hundred
percent enforcement results in allocative inefficiency because resources
allocated to enforcement do not produce an equivalent societal benefit.
For example, if the government and private sector must spend $1,000
to apprehend a violator inflicting $10 of harm on competition, then
the cost of enforcement far exceeds its benefits.
A better alternative would invest resources in enforcement only
to the point at which marginal cost of enforcement equals resulting
marginal benefit. For example, if society spends $1,000 to apprehend
violators inflicting $1,000 of harm to competition, but only achieves
eighty-percent enforcement, eighty-percent enforcement would be society's optimal enforcement level. Less enforcement would cause soci-

policy. Cf. Note, Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 STAN. L. REV. 329, 339 (1981) ("An

antitrust right that yields damages when the producer confers a net social benefit is questionable
law and unquestionably bad economics.").
53.
54.
55.
56.

K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 10, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.

57. Id.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 15.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss1/4

10

Esquibel: Protecting Competition: The Role of Compensation and Deterrence f
ANTITRUST: PROTECTING COMPETITION

ety to forego a profitable investment in enforcement. The costs of
seeking a higher level of enforcement would exceed the benefits. Thus,
antitrust enforcement should strive to equalize marginal cost and marginal benefit.6

III. THE ANTITRUST TORT: THE GOALS OF COMPENSATION AND
DETERRENCE

Realizing the necessity of government intervention, Congress simply but vaguely invited the courts to "legislate" an enforcement
mechanism.61 The most striking and well-known feature of antitrust
enforcement is section 4 of the Clayton Act. 62 Section 4 authorizes the
victim of an antitrust violation to recover treble damages.6 The elements of a private suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act include
recovery for an injury to business or property that is measurable,
and was caused by a violation of the antitrust laws.6

60. See Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer
Now and Then, 68 GEO. L.J. 1131 (1980) (the solution to the enforcement-cost problem appears
to be straightforward: "Lumber for gallows is relatively inexpensive, and few offenders would
actually be hanged; thus the cost of enforcing the antitrust laws would be trivial."). Block and
Sidak agree that enforcement should proceed to the point where marginal cost equals marginal
benefit. They make several economic arguments that it may not be optimal to continuously
trade higher fines for lower enforcement costs. Id. at 1132.
61. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ("Congress
has incorporated into the Anti Trust Acts the changing standards of the common law, and by
so doing has delegated to the courts the duty of fixing the standard for each case."), affd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
63. Id.
64. Desiderio, PrivateTreble Damage Antitrust Actions: An Outline of FundamentalPrinciples, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 409, 410 (1982) (a practitioner's checklist); see 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982). The "antitrust laws," as defined by section 1 of the Clayton Act, are the Clayton Act,
id. §§ 12-27 &29; id. §§ 52-53 (incorporating portions of the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination
Act, id. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a)), the Sherman Act, id. §§ 1-7, and portions of the Wilson Tariff Act,
id. §§ 8-11. Therefore, the plaintiff must have sustained an injury caused by such things as
price-fixing, price discrimination, boycotts, tying arrangements, exclusive dealing, attempts and
conspiracies to monopolize, and illegal mergers. Desiderio, supra, at 413-14. A 'person" under
section 4 of the Clayton Act is any natural person, corporation, state, municipality or foreign
country. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12(a), 15; Desiderio, supra, at 414. The United States does not fall
within this definition, but it may sue for actual damages and costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 15a. The
requirement that injury be to "business or property" prevents a plaintiff from recovering for
purely personal injury. See id. § 15; Desiderio, supra, at 414. The injury also must be to a
"commercial interest," broadly defined as the interest of any party in a commercial transaction,
including the ultimate consumer of a product. Desiderio, supra, at 414-15 (citing Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979)). The remainder of the elements -fact of damage, proximate
cause, antitrust injury, and measurement - are inextricably linked to the concept of damages.
See id. at 410.
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This summary shows that a section 4 cause of action resembles a
cause of action in tort for unfair business practices. 5 The Sherman
Antitrust Act included vague language such as "restraints of trade"
and "attempts to monopolize." The federal courts have viewed such
vague wording as a legislative warrant to develop the law.6 7 Accordingly, federal courts have looked to traditional tort doctrines such as
foreseeability and proximate cause s to fulfill the mandates of antitrust
law.
To prove the fact of damage, the plaintiff must prove cause-in-fact. Id. at 416. A plaintiff
must demonstrate an antitrust violation has caused him harm. Id. Although fact of damage is
conceptually distinct from the issue of measurement, the method of proving fact of damage
includes measurement of injury. Id. at 416-18. However, a plaintiff generally is held to a higher
standard in proving fact of damage than in proving the amount or measure of damages. Id. at
416-17.
The test for proving the defendant's action was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm
varies by circuit. See, e.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.) (balancing
test), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir.
1975) ("zone of interests" test); Kreager v. General Elec. Co., 497 F.2d 468 (2d Cir.) ("direct
injury" test), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 861 (1974); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L.
No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973) ("target area" test), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1975).
Most often a direct injury or target area test is employed. Desiderio, supra, at 422. These tests
focus on the plaintiffs relationship to the alleged violator or the plaintiffs position in the economy
relative to the alleged violator. Id. at 422-24. The purpose of these tests is pragmatic line-drawing. Id.
In addition to the above, the plaintiff also must be able to demonstrate antitrust injury. Id.
at 426-27. The plaintiffs loss must be an anticompetitive effect, an injury sought to be prevented
by the antitrust laws. Id. The requirement of antitrust injury is designed to prevent a windfall
to a party who has suffered because of an inability to adequately compete (i.e., an inefficient
producer). This requirement theoretically reduces the possibility of inadvertently protecting a
competitor over the competitive process. The concept of damages here has a very specialized
definition. Economic loss by a plaintiff in the presence of the defendant's unlawful conduct is
not sufficient. Id. at 427. Another significant limitation on a plaintiff is the controversial Illinois
Brick doctrine. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In essence, the Illinois
Brick doctrine may prevent an indirect purchaser or seller from suing under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. Desiderio, supra, at 428-30. Illinois Brick is another example of pragmatic linedrawing to prevent unmanageable litigation involving massive numbers of remote plaintiffs and
to mitigate the potential for multiple liability. See id. at 429-30.
65. See generally J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 1137-67 (2d ed.
1981) (discussing various commercial torts). For a thorough economic analysis of the law of
torts, see W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW vii (1987)
("This book tests the efficiency theory of the common law by examining the rules of tort law.").
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982); supra note 10 (quoting sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
67. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
68. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
529-30 (1983). A labor union sued a contractors' association for coercing some of the association's
members and other third parties into entering business agreements with nonunion firms. Id.
at 520-21. The union alleged that these arrangements were designed to weaken the union's
collective bargaining position and therefore illegally restrained the trade of the union. Id. at 523.
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Because antitrust violations are essentially federal common law

torts, the goals of antitrust should correspond to the goals of tort:
compensation and deterrence.69 Damage awards both compensate injured plaintiffs and deter potential violators. Law and society are not
indifferent to unfair wealth transfers. 17 A victim of price fixing or
predatory pricing feels wronged by the defendant. From the victim's

perspective, the deprivation of wealth may be as real and detrimental
as a personal injury because it may severely deprive the victim of the
capacity to earn money. Just as plaintiff compensation is a strong and
often cited policy for tort liability, plaintiff compensation is a reason
to impose liability on antitrust violators.
Deterrence is another reason to impose liability on antitrust vio-

lators. Society expects antitrust enforcement to discourage anticompetitive behavior much like tort liability now deters tortious behavior.
Section 4's legislative history, particularly the history of the trebling
provision, suggests that deterrence was an important consideration.
Although trebling may compensate for the costs of litigation and the
difficulties in measuring damages,71 the trebling provision undoubtedly
has deterrent effect as well.
Although antitrust has borrowed the compensation and deterrence
goals of tort,72 tort principles are not completely apposite to antitrust.
Antitrust law stems from relatively recent legislation, thus it is unbuttressed by centuries of common law precedent known to tort. Courts

69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1982) (purposes for tort actions include
compensation for harms, deterrence of wrongful conduct, and retaliation); Blair & Schafer,
Antitnst Law and Evolutionary Models of Legal Change, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 379, 385-87
(19SS). The article explores the evolution of the common law and explains why efficient rules
are litigated far more than inefficient rules. Id. at 379-81; see also Easterbrook, Is There a
Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV.705, 706 (1982) ("The Court has consistently drawn
on the common law tradition .... The common law evolves ...

in torts [and] ... antitrust

as well.").
70. Dorman, The Case fr Compensation: Why Compensatory Components are Required
for Efflcient Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1117 (1980).
71. The inclusion of a trebling provision was important to some congresspersons because
they recognized that there was a tremendous burden associated with bringing a lawsuit and
that sometimes the amount of the potential recovery might not warrant it. See H. THORELLI,
supra note 22, at 178, 182.
72. An antitrust violation may be viewed from the tort perspective of duty and breach. All
marketplace competitors have a duty to refrain from restraining trade or attempting to
monopolize. A breach of this duty occurs when a competitor attempts to restrain trade or
monopolize. The standard of care to determine this breach is that of a competitor who is
contributing to allocative efficiency. A breach of duty is intentional and violates the standard
of care because the trade restraint or attempt to monopolize causes allocative inefficiency that
results in a deadweight loss.
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struggle with basic antitrust issues of causation, injury, standing, and
damages because these issues are intertwined. Sometimes these issues
seem indistinguishable; sometimes, conceptually distinct.7 The result
of this struggle is a case law that pursues tort goals without the
stability of tort precedent. Although an antitrust violation has tort
qualities, simple tort analysis may not provide satisfactory results
because of the myriad of market conditions that complicates proof of
causation and assessment of harm. Additionally, at the threshold, antitrust must expand the traditional tort focus beyond the two parties
before the court to include the more complex assessment of the defendant's effect on competition. For antitrust enforcement to work, practitioners, legislatures, and the courts must work toward a cohesive
body of law that clearly defines an antitrust violation. Without a more
coherent case law, even the most thoughtful enforcement scheme lacks
foundation.

IV.

ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT

A. Problems with Treble Damage Suits
The Supreme Court has referred to section 4 of the Clayton Act
as "one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws." 74 Unfortunately, the weapon is less effective than Congress and
the Supreme Court had hoped. Although the threat of treble damages
may intimidate some potential violators, 75 limited recovery may actu7
ally be more effective. 6

73. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (established
the doctrine of antitrust injury, which requires a plaintiff to show that the harm was caused
by an anticompetitive act of the defendant; the presence of an antitrust violator in the marketplace
is not enough). The Supreme Court's articulation of this doctrine precipitated considerable
discourse but did not rationalize the case law. This doctrine is a classic example of the inextricable
link between liability and damages in antitrust. Some commentators have proposed solutions.
See, e.g., Page, supra note 38, at 467.
74. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1968).
75. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 10, at 113. The authors suggest the efficient
solution to antitrust enforcement is to fine the monopolists but exempt them from paying plaintiff
compensation. Id. at 113; see also Werden & Simon, supra note 15, at 935 (favorably evaluating
by type of violation the Administration's proposal).
76. Treble damages provide a windfall to plaintiff unmatched by deterrent effect. See, e.g.,
Blair, supra note 1, at 57. Although private enforcement may not provide optimal deterrence,
it does have a positive effect. Studies have attempted to empirically assess this effect. One
study hypothesized deterrence came not from the Department of Justice's criminal sanctions
but from private treble damage suits. Block, Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust
Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429, 440 (1981). A study of district court cases supported this
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Treble damages fail to deter potential violators for several reasons.
First, treble damage suits suffer from the free-rider problemY7 As
noted, free-riders diminish the effectiveness of private enforcement78
by taking advantage of it without paying. Treble damages fail to
compensate for free-riders because even with trebling, victims may
lack sufficient incentive to sue antitrust violators. An antitrust violation is a ripple through the economy.79 Although the total resulting
injury to all persons in the economy may be substantial, the effect on
any given individual may be relatively minor. 0 Trebling damages increases the individual's potential recovery, but the potential recovery
still may not exceed the cost and risk of litigation.8

For example, assume that gasoline retailers collude to fix prices
at three cents over the prevailing competitive price. If the collusion
succeeds, every consumer who buys a gallon of gasoline at the collusive
price is a victim of an antitrust violation. The number of victims could
be millions and the cumulative effect of the injury may be millions of
dollars. However, because each individual victim bought only a few
gallons and overpaid on each transaction by a mere three cents per
gallon, the individual's total harm may amount to only a few dollars.
In most cases, the cost of a lawsuit would negate the benefit of recovery even if damages were trebled. Moreover, the victim bears the
risk of litigating because the outcome of the lawsuit is uncertain.
Further, because of their complicated logistics, class action and parens

hypothesis. Id. However, most important is what this study ignores. The study does not indicate

what would be the enhanced deterrent effect if the mix of enforcement weapons were changed.
See id. at 440-44. Convictions and prison sentences are imposed so rarely, it is no surprise that
at present they have no substantial deterrent effect. Also, ironically, once the Justice Department

has obtained a conviction, the plaintiffs chances of pursuing a successful lawsuit increase. Id.
at 443 & n.39. However, the existence of some deterrent effect requires that a potential violator

take into account the risk, albeit small, that what he or she stands to gain from a violation may
be reduced by a treble damage award. Therefore, private enforcement is better than nothing
at all. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 821.
77. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977).

80.

Blair, supra note 1, at 60.

81.

The decision to award treble damages, as opposed to some other multiple, is not

grounded in any economic or deterrence logic. The trebling provision of the Clayton Act probably
was lifted from an old British statute on monopolies. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 782; see An
Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations of Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures thereof, 1623,
21 Jac., ch.3 (repealed in part by Statutes Law (Repeals), 1969, ch. 52).
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patriaem suits do not furnish sufficient incentives to overcome this
problem1'
Commentators cite several other reasons why a treble damage suit
is an ineffective deterrent4 One such reason is the tax effect of the
penalty. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code treats damage
payments under the antitrust laws as business expenses,s permitting
the violator to offset otherwise taxable income dollar for dollar 6 The
IRS disallows the deduction only if the violator suffered a criminal
conviction, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to criminal charges.Y7
Even then, the disallowance applies only to the punitive two-thirds
of the treble damage award 5 The deduction effectively operates as
a government subsidy for antitrust violations.
Another reason treble damage suits fail to deter potential violators
is because they are often directed at corporations and not individuals.
As mere legal fictions, corporations do not think, and therefore, cannot
be deterred. 9 Because the corporation committed the violation and
the corporation was sued, the corporation will likely pay a prevailing
plaintiff on a corporate check. Realistically, however, the illegal business decision came from the managers. Today, the corporate buffer
insulates decisionmakers contemplating antitrust violations from the
risks of penalty. 9° Managers might even be induced to violate the law.
From a cost/benefit standpoint, a manager could conclude that profits
from a violation outweigh the risk of a damage award.9'
The third problem with treble damage suits is the so-called "new"
antitrust strategy. 92 Under this strategy, plaintiffs threaten competitors with treble damage suits and intimidate them into compromising certain business advantages through settlement. 93 The plaintiff is

82. Parens patriae suits are those brought by the state on behalf of its citizens. See, e.g.,
infra note 83 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (holding the Clayton Act did
not authorize a state to recover for harm to its general economy).
84. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
85. See I.R.C. § 162 (1986) (deduction for business expenses).
86. See id. §§ 62, 162.
87. Id. § 16 2 (g).
88. Id.
89. Blair, supra note 1, at 62-63.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 63. Tipping the scales in this cost/benefit analysis are the corporate facts of life
that profits determine a manager's bonus and that the corporation, not the manager, will have
to pay the damage award. Id.
92. Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitnist
Strategy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1353.
93. See id. at 1353-54.
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amenable because the plaintiff never had a compensatory objective
for filing the lawsuit; instead, plaintiffs objective was obtaining business advantages.94 The plaintiff has beaten the defendant's allocatively
efficient strategy with the whip of a treble damage suit. Unfortunately,
some of these settlements may be collusive methods to discourage
competition, 95 further undermining the goals of antitrust law.
B.

Problems with Optimal Deterrence Models

Disappointment in the deterrence value of treble damages suits
has caused some theorists to consider models of optimal deterrence. 96
These models vary in approach, but all are grounded on deadweight
loss. Optimal deterrence models typically assume that all parties are
risk-neutral, all enforcement costs are zero, and the probability of
apprehension and conviction is one.9 7 Fines are the exclusive enforcement weapon, and "the fine
should equal the net harm to persons
98
offender."
the
than
other
1. Unworkable Rules of Law
A simple hypothetical involving a cartel illustrates the basic method
of an optimal deterrence model. A cartel is a group of firms colluding
to act as a monopolist. The cartel creates production efficiencies like
economies of scale represented by rectangle S. These cost savings are
greater than the deadweight loss area, ABC. Based on the optimal
fine rule, the measure of damages should equal the amount of both
the deadweight loss ABC plus the wealth transfer rectangle, P.ABPo.The objective of such a scheme is promotion of efficient violations and
deterrence of inefficient violations. 100 An efficient violation occurs when
cost savings associated with the restriction on output, rectangle S,

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1370-72. Stricter enforcement of Rule 11 sanctions might help this problem but
can only go so far with unstable precedent. Rule 11 allows a party to avoid sanctions for filing
a seemingly spurious claim if pleading argues in good faith for a change in existing law. For a
discussion of the problems and solutions surrounding sanctions, see Bloomenstein, Developing
Standardsfor the Imposition of Sanctions UnderRule 11 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
21 AKRON L. REV. 289 (1988) (guidelines for imposing Rule 11 sanctions).
96. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 653
(1983). A seminal work on the subject is Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
97. Landes, supra note 96, at 653-54.
98. Id. at 656.

99.
100.

Id. at 659.
Id. at 656-61.
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exceed the deadweight loss, ABC. 10 The cartel hypothetical represents
an efficient violation. Because of the cost savings, even after paying
a fine, an efficient violator still is motivated to confer a net benefit
on society. 10 2 The inefficient violator, on the other hand, will be deterred.' 0 3
Unfortunately, by focusing solely on the loss of allocative efficiency,
the optimal fine rule slights the net benefit. Ironically, a violator could
confer a net economic benefit on society, enhance efficiency, promote
the public policy underlying antitrust laws, and yet still have to pay
a substantial sum for breaking the antitrust laws.04 By ignoring the
violator's possible promotion of overall economic efficiency, the optimal
fine rule operates illogically. Logical rules further social policies,
maximize societal benefits, and minimize societal detriments. Rules
failing to accomplish these objectives are ineffective.
The failure of the optimal fine rule to consider the net benefit also
shows why economic theories often fail to operate well in reality.
Although the theory may be predictable and cost effective on paper,
implementing it may be possible only at costs disproportionate to
benefits. The assumptions made to derive these models are unrealistic
and illustrate the inherent limitations of theoretical models.
2.

Neglect of the Compensation Goal

The cartel example shows why optimal deterrence models can
create unworkable rules of law. Another serious problem with optimal
deterrence models is their tendency to stress deterrence and ignore
compensation. 105 Even optimal deterrence models that retain compensation relegate it to secondary status.' °6

101. This situation would result from productive efficiencies. Landes uses the example of
the exploitation of a natural resource to which no one has title. A typical example is an oil
reserve. In such a case, each competitor attempts to recover the oil by investing resources
beyond a socially desirable level. This is because all the competitors are behaving identically,
disregarding the diseconomies they are imposing on their rivals. For example, every competitor
has a drilling platform when only one is needed. If the competition can be called off by forming
a cartel, this overinvestment will cease and the oil will be recovered without wasting resources.
Id. at 658.
102. See id. at 656-61.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 22-52 and accompanying text. See generally Schwartz, An Overview
of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1075 (1980). This article explores the
problems with economic cost-minimization approaches to resolving antitrust policy issues and
reforming the enforcement scheme. Id. at 1076. Schwartz points out the difficulty in determining
both the harm caused by and the "price" of a violation. Id. at 1079-85.
105. See infra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
106. See Landes, supra note 96, at 674-77.
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Some optimal deterrence models suggest eliminating the compensatory structure altogether.107 Supporters of these models view compensation as an undesirable component of an efficient enforcement
system for three reasons. First, litigation for compensation tends to
waste judicial resources; second, it creates negative incentives to file
frivolous suits; and third, fines may be just as effective.1°s The first
two concerns have merit. Their existence, however, is not peculiar to
antitrust actions. Without proof that a deterrence focus would avoid
similar problems, these imperfections alone do not justify abandoning
the compensation goal.
The third contention - that fines can substitute for compensation
is unhelpful. Corporate fines would shield the corporate decisionmakers from penalty in the same way treble damage awards do. 10 9
The fine would not reach the individual manager actually responsible
for breaking the law.11 ° Conceivably, a judge could impose the fine
against the actual decisionmaker, but supervising such enforcement
would be difficult because the corporation could reimburse the manager
under the guise of salary or fringe benefits.,,, The corporation might
even favor reimbursing managers when the corporation profited from
the violation.
Economists ignore compensation as a critical element of effective
enforcement because of the difficulty of incorporating compensation
into an optimal deterrence model.112 Although the notion of optimal
fines easily can be incorporated into the deadweight loss analysis,11
the costs and benefits of compensation are difficult to measure. For
example, quantifying the value of a forum for civil redress is difficult.
Although a deterrence focus simplifies the model, the model falls to
consider the real costs and benefits of compensation.
Removing compensation from antitrust enforcement would be
costly.," As an alternative to treble damage suits, econometricians
could detect antitrust violations and then convene a tribunal to determine liability. If the tribunal found a defendant guilty of creating

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 10, at 113.
Id. at 81-96, 113.
Blair, supra note 1, at 64.
Id.
Id.

112.

Dorman, supra note 70, at 1113. Mr. Dorman writes in reply to Professor Schwartz,

who suggests antitrust enforcement should reject the compensatory rationale. See Schwartz,
supra note 104, at 1095.
113. See Dorman, supra note 70, at 1115.
114. Id.
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deadweight loss, then the defendant would be subject to a fine in the
amount of deadweight loss. This alternative is fraught with difficulties,
the greatest of which is the requirement of measuring deadweight
loss. Economics is too unsophisticated to precisely or routinely conduct
such empirical measures. An additional consideration is the astronomical cost of removing antitrust actions from the courts and installing
a new system capable of monitoring the entire economy.
Another alternative to a treble damages suit is a jury trial in which
the defendant would defend against an artificial plaintiff. However,
because damages traditionally depend on an assessment of a defendant's liability relative to a plaintiffs injury, a jury might not respond
to an artificial plaintiff as an enforcement mechanism and therefore
may make fewer and less substantial awards.15 Eventually, nullification would erode the deterrent effect. 1 6
In the end, economics justifies retaining compensation as an enforcement goal.17 Because the defendant merely could have refrained
from conduct to prevent the harm, the defendant's cost of prevention
was zero.118 Without access to compensation, plaintiffs might expend
resources to avoid future harm." 9 The defendant, however, not the
plaintiff, can most efficiently prevent the loss by refraining from the
violation.12o Consequently, requiring the relatively inefficient plaintiff
to forego compensation and incur protection costs misallocates resources. Requiring the defendant to compensate the plaintiff is more
allocatively efficient.1 2' Additionally, if victims are not compensated,
they may lobby for one hundred percent enforcement. One hundred
percent enforcement would protect victims' interests, but, as previously demonstrated, is not an optimal solution for society because the
marginal cost of enforcement exceeds the marginal benefit.12
C.

Imprisonment: A Superior Deterrent

The previously illustrated problems of treble damage suits show
why antitrust law needs better enforcement. "23The most effective way
115.

Id. at 1118.

116. See id. at 1117-18.
117. See Landes, supra note 96, at 672-77.
118. Id. at 672-73.
119. Id. at 673.
120. Id. at 672-73.
121. Moreover, private plaintiffs, because of their proximity to the defendant's conduct and
to the resulting harm, may be the most efficient detectors of antitrust violations. But see K.
ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 10, at 141-44. Typically the private plaintiff enters after a

government agency has ferreted out the violation and has obtained a conviction. Id. at 142.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
123. See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
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to deter potential violators is imprisonment because imprisonment
prevents penalty-shifting.1 Antitrust violations are rational crimes;3
individuals tend to violate the law when the benefits of violating the
law outweigh the costs. Imprisonment effectively would deter potential
violators because individuals would perceive the costs of a violation,
including the risk of going to prison, as higher than the benefit of
extra dollars gained from monopolization.126
Today's antitrust violators have little reason to worry about prison
sentences because judges so infrequently impose imprisonment on antitrust defendants. 12 When they do, the sentences are short and actual
time served, even shorter.m For prison sentences to be effective,
judges must impose this punishment routinely on criminal antitrust
defendants. i2 Perhaps more to the heart of the matter, they must
overcome their heavy resistance toward imprisoning a successful
businessperson.1:30 Because of the shared socialization and experience

of judges and successful businesspersons, judges may be highly sensitive to the defendant's social status, genuinely remorseful posture,
contribution to the community, and the nonviolent nature of the
crime. 131 Allowing such a defendant to avoid prison, however, sends
a clear message of tolerance to all potential violators. If sentences
reflect the character of the offense and not the character of the offender, society will see fewer antitrust violations and greater allocative
efficiency. 132
Although economists may claim that fines provide deterrence equivalent to a prison sentence, the Antitrust Division of the United States
Justice Department believes fines are a poor punishment substitute. 1 3
Several factors suggest that the Justice Department's position is cor-

124. See Blair, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 440.
126. Blair, supra note 1, at 65.
127. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 10, at 34-37.
128. Id.
129. Blair, supra note 9, at 438-39.
130. See id.; cf. Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, 47 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 249, 256 n.28 (1984) (society tends to view white-collar wrongs as civil wrongs rather

than criminal acts).
131. See D. Yeager, Discretion and the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 8 (Dec.
1938) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Florida Law Review).
132. Blair, supra note 9, at 440 (citing ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MEMORANDUM ON GUIDELINES FOR SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT (Feb. 24, 1977), as reported in J. FLYNN, Selected Statutes and Related Materials
(1977)).
133. See Blair, supra note 1, at 65.
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rect. First, individuals most likely to commit antitrust violations are
white-collar workers."- To these individuals, imprisonment carries a
particularly heavy stigma3 and would be extremely disruptive to their
personal and professional lives. Few fines are as damaging to the
white-collar business worker as the scarlet letter of a prison sentence.
Also, as previously discussed, managers easily can shift fines to corporate employers, and ultimately, consumers. Imprisonment, on the
other hand, uniquely deters because it fully extracts its penalty from
the confined defendant. 1 In one tragic instance, a defendant committed suicide after being sentenced to prison for violating federal antitrust laws. 137 This case illustrates the powerful deterrence of imprisonment. The same psychology is inapplicable to a fine or treble damage
suit.
V.

RECOMMENDATION

Antitrust laws are effective only if based on an appreciation of the
harm they seek to prevent. Deadweight loss is the harm;' 38 effective
laws would incorporate the related concept of allocative efficiency. 3 9
For practical reasons, neither one hundred percent deterrence nor
compensation for all parties is feasible.'40 The challenge, therefore, is
to work within the constraints of the enforcement system and to make
better use of available enforcement methods. The development of a

134. Id.
135. Id. "To the businessman, however, prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-reward
analysis breaks down when the risk is jail. Imprisonment, therefore, remains the most meaningful
deterrent to antitrust violations." Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critique, 86 YALE L.J.
630, 630-31 (1977).
136. See Blair, supra note 9, at 440-41 n.22.
137. United States v. McDonough Co., 180 F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Ohio 1959).
138. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
139. Id.; cf. R. BORK, supra note 38, at 7 ("[Tihe overriding need of antitrust today is a
general theory of its possibilities and limitations as a tool of rational social policy. Yet there
exists among those professionally concerned with antitrust a surprising lack of agreement concerning the most basic questions."); D. WALDMAN, supra note 38, at 20 ("Considering [the]
conflicts between the economic objective of increased competition and the objectives of lawyers
and judges, is it possible to maintain an effective antitrust policy?"); Fox, The Modernization
of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1981) ("Antitrust law is
in search of a new equilibrium. It is torn between claims that it should limit the power of large
corporations and claims that it should increase the efficiency of American business.").
140. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. One hundred percent compensation presents
the same problems that one hundred percent deterrence does. Attempting to restore all plaintiffs
would at some point lead to disproportionate results. For example, it might be necessary to
expend $1000 of judicial resources to award a plaintiff $10.
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rational case law is the key to any enforcement scheme. Until courts
more consistently and precisely define the elements of an antitrust
violation, the goals of compensation and deterrence will have little
foundation.
In addition to rationalizing the case law, improved antitrust enforcement requires reconsidering treble damages as the "bulwark of
antitrust enforcement.' 141 The free-rider problem suggests that private
enforcement will be inadequate."2 Although treble damages are an
intuitively appealing technique for overcoming the free-rider problem
and providing adequate deterrence, the effectiveness of treble damage
a
suits is undermined by procedural difficulties, lenient tax laws, and 143
plaintiff.
single
a
in
concentrated
injury
compensable
of
lack
chronic
Given all of its drawbacks, the treble damage suit does little more
than provide a windfall to some successful plaintiffs. - Currently, however, treble damages shoulder the burden of antitrust enforcement,
as criminal sanctions are imposed so rarely that few businesspeople
consider them a real threat.
A.

De-trebling

Because treble damage awards tend to overcompensate plaintiffs
without providing commensurate deterrence, proposals to de-treble
damages are rational. 14 De-trebling will lessen incentives to sue because a plaintiff with noncompensatory objectives will no longer wield

intimidating advantage by threatening

suit.146

Thus, compensation, not

intimidation, will become the primary focus of private suits.
Those opposed to de-trebling claim it will undermine compensation
and deterrence as it will cause some plaintiffs to forego legitimate
claims. 147 These results, however, are unfortunate consequences of our
legal system not unique to antitrust. Greater use of class actions and
parens patriae suits could alleviate this problem. Finally, treble damages should not attempt to compensate a plaintiff for the difficulties
of measuring compensable injury and maintaining a lawsuit.'4 Trebling
141. See Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968), overruled, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (eliminating the

intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine with respect to corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries).
142.
143.

See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.

144.

Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 792.

145.
146.
147.
148.

See, e.g., id. at 820-48; Werden & Simon, supra note 15.
See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 839-40.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

is an arbitrary way to solve these problems. Instead, a developed
for measuring
body of case law with consistent and precise standards
49
economic loss rationally could solve these problems.
B. Maintaining the Compensation Goal
De-trebling should not be interpreted as a move to eliminate compensation or prioritize deterrence. Compensation and deterrence are
equally worthy goals and both are integral to effective antitrust enforcement. De-trebling will not adversely affect a victim's right to
recover for an injury; it merely recognizes the inadequacy of treble
damage suits as a deterrent. In addition, de-trebling purifies the compensation goal by reducing noncompensatory incentives to sue.
Compensation remains a necessary component of antitrust law enforcement. 150 Crime victims often bring civil causes of action against
perpetrators to recover damages. The crime of antitrust should operate
similarly; individuals could bring civil actions for compensation even
while the violator faces imprisonment. These individuals would receive
compensation for the actual harm they suffered. In return, the violator
would face a severe penalty. Violators must face severe penalties for
de-trebling to work.

149. See, e.g., E. RE, REMEDIES (2d ed. 1987). This casebook provides no commentary
on the use of economic or financial theory in damage measurement. The issues are presented
in selected cases but there is no cohesive approach and in some instances the cases without
explanation are misleading. See, e.g., F. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.,
47 Ohio St. 2d 154, 351 N.E.2d 121 (1976), reprinted in E. RE, supra, at 818-21; see also
Polinsky, Detreblingversus DecouplingAntitrust Damages:Lessonsfrom the Theory of Enforcement, 74 GEO. L.J. 1231 (1986) (suggesting that a better system might be one in which the
plaintiff receives something different than what the defendant pays and that the emphasis on
de-trebling is misplaced); Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445
(1985). Easterbrook believes the present rules are better than any that have been proposed.
Retaining the trebling provision, he recommends a replacement for the language of sections 4
and 16 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 467.
The recommendations in this paper do not incorporate the ideas of de-coupling. Polinsky,
however, argues that it may be a superior solution to de-trebling not only in theory, but in
practice. See Polinsky, supra, at 1231, 1235-36. But such an approach requires two separate
measures: what plaintiff should receive and what defendant should pay. This refinement is
beyond the capability of the judicial system, which presently struggles only to determine the
plaintiffs harm. De-trebling has the advantage of simplicity and removes incentives to file
frivolous lawsuits. Admittedly, the recommendations in this paper may not produce an optimal
solution, but they may better approximate that solution (given the limited resources of both
litigants and the judicial system) than one based on refinements possible only in theoretical
abstractions.
150. Dorman, supra note 70, at 1114.
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C.

Imprisoningfor the Deterrence Goal

A necessary feature of de-trebling is the replacement of treble
damages with imprisonment in order to achieve the deterrence goal.
Imprisonment has unrealized deterrence potential because judges so
rarely impose prison sentences. A prison sentence, no matter how
short, carries a heavy stigma and punishes a real, identifiable person.151
Judges may hesitate to send a hard-working businessperson to prison,
but to be effective, enforcement must be more than a paper tiger.12
Judicial cooperation is critical to the de-trebling plan., s Judges must
overcome their strong resistance to imposing a severe punishment on
a repentant figure who may have a spouse, children, and a plethora
of good deeds to his or her name. 1T Judges should recognize that
however tragic the defendant's situation may seem, imprisonment is
a statutorily prescribed punishment for the crime of an antitrust violation. Judges should impose punishment by imprisonment because it
emphasizes the severity of the crime, an emphasis that enhances de-

terrence.cIrVI.

CONCLUSION

Antitrust revisionists should remember that antitrust enforcement
does not function in a vacuum. What works in theory may fail in
practice because of a casual assumption or omission. 1'6Models by necessity are simplistic, and radical reformation based on theoretical designs
may prove costly. 157 First and foremost, revisionists should consider
the fundamental antitrust purpose of furthering competition in a free
marketplace and ask if current enforcement is meeting that end. If
nothing else, such considerations will help reconcile law and economics,
and will form a foundation for intelligent discourse on antitrust enforcement reform.
Amanda Kay Esquibel

151.
152.
153.

See Blair, supra note 9, at 439.
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 438.

154.

See id. at 439.

155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Millstein, Economics: Use and Misuse - A Response to ProfessorAreeda,
52 ANTITRUST L.J. 539 (1983) (economics should illuminate issues, not dictate results). See
generally Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 21
(1985) ("One of the most startling, and . . . beneficial, developments in the law has been the

relatively recent spread of economic learning among judges... professors... [and] practitioners
....

o)

157. Cf. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 846 (may be dangerous to discard the traditional
treble damage rule in favor of new theories).
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